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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I shall attempt to state the facts with sufficient
simplicity to minimize references and to make a further
statement by opposing counsel unnecessary. (All references are to the page marking of the Clerk).
The case was before this Court previously on appeal by defendant, from a decree in equity. While the
decision on the appeal was pending an Amended Decree in Equity was entered upon stipulation of counsel
"
(p. 84). After the entry of this decree and during
late 1951 and early 1952, H. C. Pitcher, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant and its officers
constructed on his property, within the Drainage District, 1480 feet of underground, covered tile drain.
Cache County Drainage District No. 3 is located
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\vest of the city of Lewiston, 1Jtah, in the Northern
part of Cache County.

•

A detailed map is attached to

the original complaint of the total proceedings {p. 1).
The drains which gave rise to the injunction proceedings are marked in red, and con11nonly referred to
through the entire 1natter as the "new or red drains".
The old drains are in black. The District is, by natural
geographical conditions, divided into two divisions-the
North and the South Division. The North division flows
over plaintiffs''lands into what is designated on the map
as ''Outfall No. 1 '', and the South flows into ''Outfall
No.2''. The division line is definable by the direction
of the flow of water as indicated by arrows.
'

I

•

r

'-

'

''

Mr. Pitcher's land is the tract shown under his
name in the North-west quarter of Section 18, and upon
which he caused to be constructed, the additional 1480
feet of tile drains. This construction consisted of t\VO
separate drains-one for a length of 700 feet and another one of 780 feet, both of which varied in depth
from 5 feet to 5.9 feet, and both containing 6 inch tile
pipe ( p. 894). ~rn the spring the water collected on Mr.
Pitcher's land, and these drains were put in to hasten
the early run off (p. 918), and to lower the water table.
After the entry of the Amended Decree the defenant company constructed an open drain fron1 7 to 8
feet deep (p. 927), and which conformed in general to
the already existing open drains in black and red. The
beginning of this drain \vas at approximately the center
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ment of Points above all run to the same general propos-ition. We have thus narrowed the issues and are no\v
confronted with the interpretation by the Court in its
Decree of the 30th day of October, 1952, of the terms
and provisions of the An1ended Decree of the Court
dated the lOth day of December, 1951. The Decree
appealed from is found at page 872 of the record. The
Amended Decree with which we are concerned with the
interpretation is found at page 846 of the record.
It is our contention that the Amended Decree needs
no int~rpretation because of the plain wording thereof.
In paragraph 1, the drainage district is granted a perpetual easement over the plaintiffs' lands for the purpose
of draining all of the lands being in the northern division of the district, and to drain those lands by means
of, ''ditches and drains from its system in the manner
of operation as the same existed on April 8, 1947."
Paragraph 2 is the restraining provision and enjoins
the defendants, its officers, its agents, and its employees
from the construction of any new drains, either within
or without the district, and prevents any enlargement
of any old drains. The defendants claim the right to
construct the new tile drains because of their diversion
dam, which diverts a portion of the waters from outfall No. 1 to outfall No. 2. If the defendants will
abandon the portion of their easement as granted them
in the Arnended Decree, this rnatter could be rapidly
settled without an appeal; but this they will not do.
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In construing the Decree, effect must be given to
all of its provisions as stated by this Court in the case
of Salt Lake City vs. Telluride Power Company, (Utah)
17 P. 2d. 281, where this Court said:

''In construing the decree, it should be construed together as a whole so as to give meaning and force to all of its terms, and if a reasonable construction can be had which will give
force to all of its wording, such a construction
should be made. 23 Cyc. 1101. This being so,
·the only way to give effect to the words "pumped
water'' would be to construe the two paragraphs
. together. This we interpret to mean that all of
said irrigation and canal companies shall pay for
the operation and maintenance in proportion to
the number of acre feet of pumped water used
by each. The language of the fifth paragraph
referring to the number acre feet used is limited
by the wording of paragraph 3, where the first
reference is made to the means of apportioning
the cost of maintaining and operating the pumps.
Any other construction would treat as surplusage the· words "pumped water," and in effect
amount to striking them from the decree. This
being so, it is the opinion of this court that the
North Jordon Irrigation Company, under the
decree of 1912, would only be obligated to pay
for the number of acre feet of pumped water
actually used by it."
The construction placed on the Amended Decree by
the lower court in effect arnounts to striking from paragraph 1 of the Decree the last portion which provides
that the easeinent 1uay only be effective by the use
of t1 te drains and ditehes as the drainage syHt(:.ln Pxisted
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7
The lower court's construction fur-

ther an1ounts to striking from paragraph 2 the injunction 'vhich prohibits the defendants from draining any
w·ater within or without the district which may be,
··created, developed, or increased by the construction
of any ne'v drains.'' Defendants have always contended
in these conten1pt proceedings that they, in effect, have
not coursed more water over plaintiffs' lands than was
previously the case, and have contended in fact that
they have benefited the plaintiffs. This contention
places the perpetual duty on the plaintiff of measuring
the a;mount of water from year to year in the drain
and to compare it to the waters flowing through this
system as of April 8, 1947. This proposition was decided by this Court in the case of Utah Power and
Light Company vs Richmond Irrigation Company, et
al, (Utah) 13 P. 2d. 320. Our case is sufficiently similar to the Utah Power case that we feel it is controlling
of every element presented by this appeal and rely
strongly on that case. The question of whether or not
the diversion dam diverts water that would otherwise
flow over plaintiffs' property is not involved. Under
the Utah Power decision where this Court said:
"To argue, however, that without an agreement among the parties or without application
to the court having and retaining jurisdiction of
the -waters of a stream under a valid and subsisting decree, that a party to such decree may proceed to 11cquire right adverse to the other parties
to the decree by an alleged development, or by
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making a t~Jse or claiming a right without first
having made an appeal to the court to be heard
upon the basis of fundamental equities, may not
be done.''
If the defendants are permitted to prevail in this
case, we predict the next step will be an enlargement
of the district and the construction of additional new
drains. This was disposed of also in the Utah Power
case:
''A contempt proceeding for the purpose of
maintaining the validity, purposes, and sanctity
of the decrees of the court may not by answer
attacking the decree under the guise of a subsequently acquired right in violation of the decree transform the proceedings into an equity
proceeding to escape the consequences of a deliberate violation. Rights once determined by
a valid decree of the court, accepted and in force,
must be respected. Courts of equity have always
had a ready disposition to attend and hear a
petitioner who comes with clean hands and a
righteous cause. ''
The construction of the amended decree sought by
the defendants would amount to a modification of the
decree, and a decree may not be modified by a construction as was said in the case of Salt Lake City
vs Salt I.. ake Water & Electric Power Company, (Utah)
174 Pacific 1134, the sante problem was encountered,
and the Court said:
''Where, however, as here, the language of
the decree by which all parties are bound is free
from ambiguity and doubt, then the rule is ele-
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of the North boundary of the Ethel Rigby property, and
flo"red generally in a southwesterly direction, and connected with the drains which flowed out through "Outfall No. 2' '.

The co1npany then constructed a dam

in the drain "~hich runs due West from the point where
the last described new open drain ,connects at the head
with the old drain system. This dam was to divert
some of the drain waters from the Northern division
(outfall No. 1), into the Southern division (outfall No.
2). 'l,he dam was an earth fill and the spring it was
put in, the high run-off water took it out, and at the
time of the trial it had not been replaced.
With reference to the tile drains placed by Mr.
Pitcher, these were no part of the drainage system of
the company as it existed on April 8, 1947 (p. 957).
The defendants consulted their attorneys prior to
the installation of the Pitcher drains, and their attorneys
advised them that such installation was not contrarv
.,
to the terms of the A1nended Decree, and in the construction thereof, they acted upon the advice of counsel.
Tli defendants claim a perpetual easement over the
lands of the plaintiffs to drain all of the lands within
the Northern Division of the District, and the plaintiffs claim that the construction of the Pitcher tile
drains constitutes contempt of Court.
No petition for modification or other change in the
Amended Decree was applied for prior to the construe-
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tion of the Pitcher drains.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON BY THE
APPELLANTS
The Court erred in the following respects:
1. By making and entering its Decree in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiffs and dated
the 30th day of October, 1952.
2. By 1naking and entering its following findings
of fact: Nos. 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 13.
3. By making and entering its following conclusions of law: Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
This point goes to the Inatter of the error of the
Court in entering its Decree adjudging the defendants
not guilty of conteinpt and in hol~ing in paragraph
2, thereof, that the defendants by the Amended Decree,
which was dated the lOth day of December, 1951, are
permitted to extend and construct any drains within
the limits of the drainage district so long as said new
drains do not increase the burdens on plaintiffs' lands.
In discussing the case with Mr. Charles P. Olson,
one of counsel for defendant, we feel that this is the
only issue to be presented b~· this appeal and the staten1ent of points relied upon as to the appellant's objPctions to the Courts findings a~ s<~t forth in the State-
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mentary that extraneous circumstances and conditions 1nay not be resorted to if to do that makes
the meaning of the language ambiguous. Exfraneous 1natters may be invoked to clear up
uncertainty and doubts, but not to create then1.
Neither is this a case where it is necessary or
proper to expand or restrict the meaning of words
or phrases to creat harmony between conflicting
proVIsions. There is no reason whatever why
the natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning of
the language used in the decree should not be
followed. If, under such circumstances, the ordinary meaning of the language used is departed from, there is really no limit to which a
Court could not go. The exigencies of the particular case would perhaps suggest a limit, ·but
even that could not prove a deterrent in all cases.
The only safe and rational rule, therefore, is to
abide by the natural and ordinary meaning of
the language used, and such rule we feel is duty
bound to follow in this as in all other cases.
. . . If, however, conditions requiring it have
arisen that can be established by proper evidence,
the lower court has ample power to modify the
decree so as to reflect equity and justice under
all circumstanecs to all water users. The decree
cannot, howver, be modified by construction.''
(mine).
It is helpful to refer to the conclusion of law No.
3 made by the court in this case (p. 16).
''That the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction against defendant forever enjoining defendant from coursing or running any water
from any new, additional or enlarged drains of
whatever name or nature through plaintiffs'
premises. ' '
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The amended decree does not change that conclusion

of law. The defendants were permitted in the decree
(p. 847) to improve the drainage system but these improvments were restricted as follows :
''Nothing contained in this injunction shall
be construed to prevent or enjoin the defendant,
its officers, agents, and employees from making
any improvements to or mainten~ce bf its
drainage system as it existed on April 8, 1947."
See Huber vs. Newman, (Utah) 145 P. 2d. 780.
It is interesting to note that in the amended decree,
which incidently was drawn by Mr. Young and on his
stationery, that the plaintiff was given damages for
the ·construction of, ''the new drain north of and· outside of the district." That was apparently because
it was not a part of the drainage system as it existed
on April 8, 1947.
Now, because Mr. Pitcher has constructed 1,480
feet of new drains within the boundary lines of the
district, the defendants claim they are si~ply a part of
the system as it existed on April 8, 1947. This we believe is a construction strained to the breaking point.
When the an1ended decree was entered there was no
thought given by any of the parties to the diversion
of part of the waters through Outfall No. 2; and therefore, no construction can be placed upon the decree
which was not contemplated nor contended for at the
time of the en try of the decree.
Gunnison Irrigation vs Gunnison Highland Canal
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Company, (lTtah) 17-! P. 852.

In that case the court

said:
''To sustain the position of respondent upon
this appeal, it would be necessary to hold that
the trial court in its decision departed from the
path marked out by the pleadings. The record
does not justify such a conclusion. But even
ifthe trial court had so departed from the issues,
the legal effect of its decree would be limited
to the issues raised by the pleadings. ''
POINT II
Finding No. 4 (p. 869) was in error because the
lower court ·decided that the constructions of the new
1,480 feet of drain did not violate the terms of the
amended decree; and while the defendants acted on
advice of counsel, they must do so at their own peril.
And they cannot escape the effect of the decree by
this conduct because such a course would make a lawyer's opinion paramount to the sanctity of a decree
in equity.
Finding No. 6 (p. 869) is in error because there
is no evidence to sustain the same.
Finding No. 8 (p. 869) is in error because of the
matters pointed out in the argument on Point I, namely
that the construction of the barrier dam to cause waters
to flow through Outfall No. 2 could only reduce the flow
through Outfall No. 1, if the defendants have abandoned their easement to drain waters from all of the
district, northern section, through Outfall No. 1. They
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refuse to abandon the said easement or a part of it,
and we openly ask them now in this appeal if they,
by the construction of the barrier dam, intend to abandon a portion of the easement.
Finding No. 10 (p. 870) is in error because there
is no evidence to support the same, and for the further
reason that plaintiffs' witness testified (p. 889) that
there was 1,480 feet of excavation made for the two
drains in question and Mr. Young stipulated (p. 890)
as follows:
"If the Court please, may I make this observation. The answer in this case admits that
the drains were dug. I didn't think there would
·be any issue about that.''
and the work was done with the assistance of the United
States Department of Agriculture, which has a ruling
as follows:
''No assistance will be given for repairing
or maintaining existing drains.'' (p. 892)
The lower court felt that this evidence was immaterial; but we submit in view of the finding of the court
in its No. 10, that it is highly material or that the
court should not have made finding No. 10.
Finding No. 12 is in error because the question
of damages in this kind of a case is absolutely immaterial. In the pretrial order (p. 857) we find the following:
''The parties having stipulated in open court,
the court deter1nines that the plaintiff may be
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·entitled-to relief as a n1atter of law without proving any damage.''

POINT III
la"~

The conclusions of

entered by the court from 1

to 5, inclusive, are in error for the same- reasons as
pointed. out above relative to the finding of fact.
The history of this case shows the plaintiffs have
been forced to protect themselves· over a great many
years, and it is to protect against future encroachments
that this appeal is brought.
The map (p. 1) which .defendants had prepared,
shows that the district has been once enlarged; it also
shows that a drain was constructed outside the. district.
The.. -evidence _shows_ (p. 981-982) that a Mr. Hyer,
whose land adjoins Mr. Pitcher's, is awaiting the outcome of this action, and that he consulted Judge Jones
with relation to the meaning of the decr~e in question.
And the. evidence further shows at the above pages that
all of the Lewiston territory needs more drainage.
Mr. Hyer
to answer the direct question as to
. _refused
.
whether or not he intended to install more drains. He
was asked this question:
.

- .

•

'

~

•

•' .

'

,._ j : .

Q. ''If Mr. Pitcher is permitted to retain the operation of ,the t'Yo tile drains involved in this action, it
is your intention to do the same thing on your property,
isn't it~"
A.

''I don't know.''
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Q. "Will you say that you don't want to!"
A.

"No."

Q.

''Will you say that your property needs itt''

A.

"Yes."

In short, that is the crux of this whole case. If
the defendants are permitted to retain the new Pitcher
drains, there is nothing to prevent them from enlarg-:
ing the district again and thus perpetuate a continual
round of law suits which a court of equity is designed
to prevent. The mistake which we believe the defendants are operating under is that they have an easement
to drain a certain quantity of water off plaintiffs'
lands. This is a falacy because their easement perpetuated by the amended decree is as follows: (p. 847)
'' F.or the purpose of discharging therein and
conveying across the premises of the plaintiffs,
through said channel, from its artificial ditches
and drains, all of the water as created, conducted
and conveyed by said ditches and drains from
its system IN THE MANNER OF OPERATION
AS THE SAME EXISTED ON APRIL 8, 1947."
(Caps Mine)
DATED this 26th day of March, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. D. PRESTON
Attorney for Appellants
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